The Actions and Inactions of the Commander in Charge of the U.S. Air Defense Failure on 9/11

"During those entire 109 minutes ... this country
and its citizens were completely undefended."
 

- Senator Mark Dayton

General Ralph Eberhart was the commander in chief of NORAD--the military organization responsible for defending U.S. airspace--when the 9/11 attacks occurred. Considering that NORAD failed to intercept any of the four aircraft targeted in the attacks and successfully defend New York and Washington, one would reasonably expect Eberhart to have been somehow held to account. And yet that did not happen.

In fact, nine years on, we still know very little about what Eberhart did while the 9/11 attacks were taking place. From what we do know, his actions seem far from reassuring. Eberhart at least gave the impression of having an unclear picture of what was going on. Accounts of his actions reveal no decisive attempts to respond to the attacks. He appears to have been particularly slow to order a plan that would give the military control of U.S. airspace and get all aircraft grounded. Furthermore, in the middle of the attacks, he decided to drive from his office at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, to NORAD's operations center in Cheyenne Mountain--a journey that apparently put him out of the loop for about an hour.

EBERHART'S ACTIONS ON 9/11
Ralph Eberhart began the morning of September 11, 2001 at NORAD headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base. [1] He told the 9/11 Commission that he learned of the crisis that was unfolding when the command director at NORAD's Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (presumably Captain Michael Jellinek) called at 8:45 a.m.--one minute before the first World Trade Center tower was hit--and "informed him of the ongoing circumstance of a suspected hijacking on the East Coast." Eberhart subsequently went to his office and saw the television coverage of the first attack on the WTC.

He "asked if the aircraft that was suspected of impacting the World Trade Center was the same aircraft that was a suspected hijack, and was told that they were not." Eberhart has recalled that there was apparently "great confusion in the system" at this time. But after news broke of the second attack on the WTC, he said, it was "obvious" to him that there was "an ongoing and coordinated terrorist attack" taking place. [2] And yet his subsequent actions were hardly impressive, considering the urgency of the situation.

Eberhart tried contacting General Henry Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but was unable to, since Shelton was airborne at the time, on his way to a NATO meeting in Europe. Eberhart then "contacted higher command authority at the Pentagon," he has recalled. [3]

He also spoke briefly with General Richard Myers, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was on Capitol Hill, where he had been meeting with Senator Max Cleland. At some point between 9:03 a.m. and 9:30 a.m., according to Myers's recollection, Eberhart phoned the vice chairman's military aide on his cell phone, which the aide then passed to Myers.

EBERHART UNCLEAR ABOUT DETAILS OF HIJACKINGS AND NORAD'S RESPONSE
Eberhart updated Myers on the crisis, telling him the two WTC towers had been hit and there were "several hijack codes in the system." This, according to Myers, meant "that the transponders in the aircraft [were] talking to the ground, and they're saying ... we're being hijacked." [4] However, if Myers's recollection is correct, Eberhart was apparently either mistaken or deliberately giving false information: None of the pilots of the four flights targeted that morning keyed the code that would indicate a hijacking into their plane's transponder. [5] There should have been no "hijack codes in the system" at that time.

Eberhart told Myers he was working with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to get all aircraft over the U.S. to land. He also said NORAD would be launching fighter jets in response to the attacks. [6] As Myers would recall two days later, "I think the decision was, at that point, to start launching aircraft." [7] However, NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), based in upstate New York, had already launched fighters by that time: Two F-15s had taken off from Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts at 8:46 a.m. [8] So if Myers's account is correct, Eberhart--the man in charge of NORAD--was apparently either unaware of the actions of NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector or knowingly giving out false information.

Furthermore, when he was interviewed by the 9/11 Commission in March 2004, Eberhart claimed he'd had "no knowledge of the circumstances that initiated the scramble" of fighter jets from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia at 9:24 a.m. [9] Extensive evidence uncovered by the Commission showed that NEADS scrambled those fighters in response to an incorrect report it had received that American Airlines Flight 11--which hit the WTC at 8:46 a.m.--was still airborne and heading south, toward Washington, DC. [10] At the time of his 9/11 Commission interview, Eberhart said, he had only "recently" been made aware of these circumstances. [11] How could the man in charge of NORAD on September 11 have been unaware of such crucial information for nearly two and a half years after the attacks occurred?

After learning of the attacks in New York, Eberhart stayed at Building 1 at Peterson Air Force Base--the headquarters of the Air Force Space Command, which, as well as NORAD, he was the commander of--because, he said, "he did not want to lose communication." [12] However, he soon set out on a journey that caused him to lose communication with others involved in the emergency response for 45 minutes or longer.

EBERHART OUT OF COMMUNICATION WHILE TRAVELING TO OPERATIONS CENTER
At "approximately 9:30," according to his own recollection, Eberhart left Peterson Air Force Base and headed to the NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain. [13] The operations center was about 12 miles away, a journey that takes "roughly 30 minutes," according to the 9/11 Commission Report. But, as the Washington Post noted, "The trip to Cheyenne Mountain can be time-consuming if traffic is bad," and the drive took Eberhart 45 minutes. [14]

The journey may in fact have taken even longer. Eberhart told the 9/11 Commission that by the time he arrived at the operations center, the authorization for the military to shoot down threatening aircraft had been passed down NORAD's chain of command. NORAD finally passed on this authorization to its three air defense sectors at 10:31 a.m., which would imply that Eberhart reached the operations center shortly after that time, more than an hour after he said he left Peterson Air Force Base. [15]

Furthermore, while he was making the journey to Cheyenne Mountain, Eberhart "couldn't receive telephone calls as senior officials weighed how to respond," according to the Denver Post. [16] He reportedly "lost a cell phone call with Vice President Dick Cheney." The reason why Eberhart had problems receiving phone calls is unclear, though it has been reported that "New repeater stations were installed almost immediately" after 9/11, "to fix the phone problem." [17]

During the period when he was reportedly traveling to the operations center, at 9:49 a.m., Eberhart "directed all air sovereignty aircraft to battle stations, fully armed" over the Pentagon's air threat conference call, according to the 9/11 Commission Report. [18] Presumably he was either able to successfully issue this order himself despite his communication problems, or the order was issued on his behalf by a subordinate who was participating in the air threat conference call. However, when an aircraft is at "battle stations," its pilot is in the cockpit, but with the engines turned off, ready to start them and taxi out only if a scramble order should follow. [19] So Eberhart's order would have meant that any air sovereignty aircraft not already airborne would have remained on the ground, rather than immediately getting into the air, where they could have quickly intercepted a hostile aircraft.

The reason Eberhart decided to relocate to Cheyenne Mountain at such an important time, when his uninterrupted participation in the crisis response would presumably have been essential, is unclear. According to the Colorado Springs Gazette, the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center "had communications capabilities not available at Peterson." [20] And Eberhart told the 9/11 Commission that, on his communications loop, it had "quieted down" before he decided to head out to the mountain. [21]

All the same, if Eberhart's account of his actions is correct, it would mean that, in the middle of the worst terrorist attack in the history of the U.S., the commander of NORAD was, at least to some degree, out of the loop for maybe an hour or more.

MILITARY ONLY TAKES CONTROL OF SKIES AFTER ATTACKS ENDED
The one key action Ralph Eberhart is known to have taken in response to the 9/11 attacks was to implement a modified version of a plan called "SCATANA," which would clear the skies and give the military control over U.S. airspace. However, Eberhart only ordered that this plan be put into operation at around 11:00 a.m., about two hours after the second WTC tower was hit and it became "obvious" to him that a coordinated terrorist attack was taking place.

When he was asked before the 9/11 Commission why it had taken so long to initiate the plan, Eberhart recalled that people had been approaching him and telling him to "declare SCATANA." However, he added, NORAD "could not control the airspace that day with the radars we had and all the aircraft that were airborne. ... So, if I suddenly say, 'We've got it, we will control the airspace,' we would have had worse problems than we had that morning because I cannot provide [air] traffic deconfliction like the FAA has."

Eberhart therefore requested that a modified version of SCATANA be devised, telling those that were calling for the plan, "I will execute SCATANA once you have a modified SCATANA that clearly delineates the lines in the road and doesn't cause a bad situation to become worse." The modified SCATANA that Eberhart subsequently implemented allowed navigational aids to stay on, and selective approval for specific and necessary flights. [22]

Eberhart was implying to the 9/11 Commission that his delay in ordering SCATANA was due to the time required to put together this modified version of it. However, he has not specified the time at which he asked his colleagues to start preparing the modified SCATANA. Was it at 9:03 a.m., when the second WTC tower was hit and everyone realized that the U.S. was under attack--a time when the value of such a plan would presumably have been obvious? Or was it later on? If later on, how much later?

AMERICA 'COMPLETELY UNDEFENDED' DURING ATTACKS
A fuller analysis of Ralph Eberhart's actions on September 11 will only be possible when more evidence comes to light revealing what he did at the time of the attacks. It seems remarkable that we still know so little about the actions of the man who, as commander of NORAD, was in charge of the air defense of the U.S. In that role, Eberhart oversaw a catastrophic failure, which, in the words of Senator Mark Dayton, meant that for "109 minutes ... this country and its citizens were completely undefended." [23]

And yet, rather than being held accountable, or even just criticized, for that failure, in October 2002 Eberhart was put in charge of the newly created Northern Command (NORTHCOM), described as "the nation's premier military homeland defense organization," which had the mission of countering threats and aggression against the United States. [24]

As Dayton concluded, "The situation is urgent when we do not get protected in those circumstances [that occurred on 9/11], and it is even worse when it is covered up." [25]

NOTES
[1] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 465.

[2]
"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart." 9/11 Commission, March 1, 2004.
[3] Ibid.; Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security. New York: Threshold Editions, 2009, p. 10.

[4] Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski. NBC News, September 11, 2002;
"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Richard Myers, Affiliated With NORAD." 9/11 Commission, February 17, 2004; Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, Eyes on the Horizon, p. 9.
[5] "Government Official Has New Evidence Regarding Hijacked Airlines." CNN, September 11, 2001.
[6] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Richard Myers, Affiliated With NORAD"; Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, Eyes on the Horizon, p. 9.
[7] Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) Holds Hearing on Nomination of General Richard Myers to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 107th Cong., 1st sess., September 13, 2001.
[8] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 20.
[9] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart."
[10] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 26-27, 34.
[11] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart."
[12] "General Ralph E. 'Ed' Eberhart." U.S. Air Force, February 2004; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart."
[13] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart."
[14] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 465; T. R. Reid, "Military to Idle NORAD Compound." Washington Post, July 29, 2006.
[15] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 42; Lynn Spencer, Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11. New York: Free Press, 2008, p. 240.
[16] Bruce Finley, "Military to Put Cheyenne Mountain on Standby." Denver Post, July 27, 2006.
[17] Pam Zubeck, "Cheyenne Mountain's Fate May Lie in Study Contents." Colorado Springs Gazette, June 16, 2006.
[18] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 38, 463.
[19] Leslie Filson, Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission. Tyndall Air Force Base, FL: 1st Air Force, 2003, p. 55; Lynn Spencer, Touching History, p. 27.
[20] Pam Zubeck, "Cheyenne Mountain's Fate May Lie in Study Contents."
[21] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart."
[22] William B. Scott, "Exercise Jump-Starts Response to Attacks." Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 3, 2002; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Twelfth Public Hearing. 9/11 Commission, June 17, 2004; Lynn Spencer, Touching History, p. 269.
[23] Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Making America Safer: Examining the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. 108th Cong., 2nd sess., July 30, 2004.
[24] Gerry J. Gilmore, "Eberhart Tabbed to Head U.S. Northern Command." American Forces Press Service, May 8, 2002; "Key Players: Commander, Northern Command, Gen. Ralph Eberhart." Government Executive, April 15, 2003.
[25] Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Making America Safer: Examining the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

 

He Just Sat There? He Was "Allowed" To Just Sit There?

Why'd ya go to the school, that day?
Why'd the Secret Service let you stay?
Didn't know the extent of the attack
You Just sat there like a literary hack - uh huh!
Secret Service they just stood there
Secret Service they really didn't care
The whole of your story, it doesn't add up.

top video!

well done, i like the video
i also like this blog post- much more informative than a lot of what usually dilutes 9/11 blogger from the usual culprits
Douglas Hilton

[6/23/10 - edited by moderator to remove spam video post]

Excellent article Shoestring

The behavior of Gen. Ralph Eberhart on 9/11 is very puzzling and suspicious indeed.

During his testimony in front of the 9/11 Commission Generals Myers actually claimed that he was concerned that they may be violating Posse Comitatus regarding using the military to defend against hijacked airlines. And Generals Eberhart, Arnold and Myers all claimed that NORAD's mission was "outward looking" although many government documents prove this to be completely false.

From the 9/11 Commission Hearings:

MS. JAMIE GORELICK: In my experience, the military is very clear about its charters, and who is supposed to do what. So if you go back and you look at the foundational documents for NORAD, they do not say defend us only against a threat coming in from across the ocean, or across our borders. It has two missions, and one of them is control of the airspace above the domestic United States, and aerospace control is defined as providing surveillance and control of the airspace of Canada and the United States. To me that air sovereignty concept means that you have a role which, if you were postured only externally you defined out of the job.

GEN. MYERS: Right. A couple of comments, Ms. Gorelick. First, I don't know that the military has ever resisted, I mean, those are your words. What we try to do is follow the law, and the law is pretty clear on Posse Comitatus and that is whether or not the military should be involved in domestic law enforcement.

MS. GORELICK: Let me just interrupt, when I was general counsel of the Defense Department, I repeatedly advised, and I believe others have advised that the Posse Comitatus says, you can't arrest people. It doesn't mean that the military has no authority, obligation, or ability to defend the United States from attacks that happen to happen in the domestic United States.

MR. (GEN) LARRY ARNOLD TO MR. KERREY: we were not postured to handle that threat.
--------------------------------------------------

We all know that the NRO was running a drill of a hijacked plane crashing into their building on the morning on 9/11. The official NRO website describes their mission as the following:

The Rapid Targeting Capability - is primarily designed for aircraft going after mobile targets that aircrews operating on alert haven't had the opportunity to preplan... These different pictures give the pilot a perspective he wouldn't get from a tactical aircraft alone and aids him in finding the target… The system is an example of how the National Reconnaissance Office, which designs, builds and operates the nation's spy satellites, is providing the warfighter with information he didn't have in the past.
---------------------------------------------------

On 9/11 the military radar station in Massachusetts, which is used by the Northeast Air Defense Sector, is down this morning in order to undergo maintenance work from 6:30 am - 12:00 pm. This is the main radar unit that NEADS uses to monitor US airspace in the northeast region of the country. More distance radar installations will eventually have to be used to try to track the hijacked aircraft.
--------------------------------------------------

Global Guardian (War Game)

According to a 1998 Internet article by the British American Security Information Council—an independent research organization—Global Guardian is held in October or November each year. [Kristensen, 10/1998] In his book “Code Names,” NBC News military analyst William Arkin dates this exercise for October 22-31, 2001. [Arkin, 2005, pp. 379] And a military newspaper reported in March 2001 that Global Guardian was scheduled for October 2001. [Space Observer, 3/23/2001, pp. 2 ] If this is correct, then some time after March, the exercise must have been rescheduled for early September. Furthermore, there may be another important facet to Global Guardian. A 1998 Defense Department newsletter reported that for several years Stratcom had been incorporating a computer network attack (CNA) into Global Guardian. The attack involved Stratcom “red team” members and other organizations acting as enemy agents, and included attempts to penetrate the Command using the Internet and a “bad” insider who had access to a key command and control system. The attackers “war dialed” the phones to tie them up and sent faxes to numerous fax machines throughout the Command. They also claimed they were able to shut down Stratcom’s systems. Reportedly, Stratcom planned to increase the level of computer network attack in future Global Guardian exercises. [IAnewsletter, 6/1998 ] It is not currently known if a computer attack was incorporated into Global Guardian in 2001 or what its possible effects on the country’s air defense system would have been if such an attack was part of the exercise.
--------------------------------

Brigadier General W. Montague Winfield and Captain Charles Leidig on 9/11

On September 10, 2001 General W. Montague Winfield, Director of the National Military Command Center inside of the Pentagon, asks his Deputy Charles Leidig to take control of the NMCC the next morning starting at 8:30am. Leidig had started his role as Deputy for Command Center Operations two months earlier and had qualified to stand in for Winfield just in the previous month of August. Leidig, as Watch Commander, is now in charge of supervision and operations of all necessary communications. Leidig remains in charge from a few minutes before the 9/11 crisis begins until about 10:30 a.m. After the last hijacked plane crashes. Leidig presides over an important crisis response teleconference that has a very slow start, not even beginning until 9:39 a.m. Winfield claims to have been in the loop right after 9:03am when Flight 175 struck the South Tower but he will not take back command of the NMCC from Leidig until around 10:30am. After the attacks had ended.

Pure speculation on my part: Was General W. Montague Winfield the "bad insider" during Global Guardian? Was the P-tech and Mitre Corporation software used as a backdoor to override the commands of those officers trying to respond to 9/11. (This is the information that Indira Singh spoke about.)

"several hijack codes in the system"

Could that refer to the hijacking simulations in the morning's anti-hijacking exercises?

The HI PERPS want to focus upon later times...

One of the reasons that I broke my silence regarding 9/11 was the article by Bronner in Vanity Fair where it was clear to me that the HI PERPS were taking deliberate steps to push all consideration of NORAD's failures downstream in time to a point AFTER UA175 hit WTC2...and even after AA77 and UA93 had met their end.

This blog is somewhat unintentionally buying into, or supporting, that meme and it needs to be dispelled. A vast majority of focus and investigations must be kept on the EARLY aviation aspects of 9/11...AKA: beginning at 08:14.

Basically the HI PERPS want us to focus upon and discuss the wherabouts and actions of high level officials in the Pentagon, NMCC, NORAD, NEADS and FAA HQ well after the critical activities were well under way IE: when the the truthful failures are observable just after 08:14.

This is when AA11 took on signs of being an airliner suffering an in-flight-emergency by losing radio contact, losing a transponder signal, and more than anything else, by deviating WELL OFF COURSE WITHOUT ANY FAA APPROVAL or ATC CLEARANCES TO DO SO. This is the time gateway that the HI PERPS want ignored and the gateway from which we need to ALWAYS focus our attention upon.

Please note that all the "discussions and information" about hijacking and Arabic voices that are in the "official story and evidence?" are deliberately highlighted, or have been cleverly created-implanted to establish the innocence of the Pentagon and its NORAD/NEADS operations attempting to establish that these institutions and high ranking personnel were informed TOO LATE to do anything about it. This is complete malarkey yet it is being reinforced, deliberately or innocently, all around the debate, dialogue and discussion from both sides...the HI PERPS and the 9/11 Truth Movement.

Its clear now that the first testimony about communications between the FAA and the Military about AA11 being an airliner suffering an in-flight emergency first and then being considered as a possible hijacking, was approximately 08:27-28 when the Boston ARTCC tried to contact the NORAD/NEADS field operations at Otis Air Base. There were over 40 phone calls to and from NEADS beginning at the 08:27-28 time period as told by Colin Scoggins the Military Liaison [sp] officer working at the Boston ARTCC. THESE are the facts that the Pentagon has been trying to get around all this time...THESE are the facts that have caused the Pentagon and its departments to issue three different timelines...THESE are the facts that indict the Pentagon and its military departments with complicity if not total execution of the 9/11 attacks. We shouldn't let them slip off the hook.

To be discussing what the Military or FAA brass was talking about, what they were doing and what they knew is all distractionary. What needs to constantly put into the discussion are three basic points:

1. Dean Jackson has shown that NORAD's responsibilities along with its RADAR CAPABILITIES were NOT outward looking, but in fact were both inward and outward looking. Also please note that John Farmer, Chief Counsel for the 9/11 Commission, has exposed in his book: Ground Truth, that NEADS/NORAD were flight following a Delta Airlines airlner in the vicinity of Toledo, Ohio...which is NOT outward looking at all. They are cooked by one of their own.

2. The NET RESULT of the June change to the Joint Chiefs of Staff involvement regarding interceptor scramble procedures is that NO SCRAMBLES were reported between June, 2001 and the morning of 9/11/2001. In the ten years prior to that time there had been approximately 1500 scrambles..NONE for hijackings...which translates to approximately 150 scrambles per year. Additionally, in the months before June 2001 there were 67 scrambles reported. And here is something to remember: summertime is the busiest time of the aviation year and in the three+ months between June and September 11th, it would be appropriate to expect upwards of 45-60 scrambles as more inexperienced pilots would be taking to the skies in some of the most volatile weather situations in the aviation year. But there were NONE.

Now, everyone can attempt to parse the wording of, or notice the repositioning of, or consider the realignment of, or guess the reasons behind the reference to Special Military Operations [Order 7610.4] under or within the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Order 3610.01a] and it now being directly associated with the Joint Chief's Orders when for the fifty years earlier no such connection, no matter how strong or weak, was ever needed for NORAD to perform its duties...and expediciously so...aka...lightneing quick. BUT...the facts are that no scrambles were reported AFTER the June 2001 Change was instituted. PERIOD! The June Change had had its affect.

THIS is the most signaificant NORAD point that should never be forgotten. After the June Change...there were no successful scrambles until after all the airliners had crashed/disappeared on 9/11/2001. The only successful scrambles were to establish CAPS over the big metro cities. Its that simple.

And, in order to cover the CHANGE IN SCRAMBLE PROTOCOLS without leaving footprints...

[Do you really think that Cheney's SECRET "Energy Task Force and 9/11 Terrorist Attack" meetings would make observable modifications to existing protocols in a fashion so as to allow an average reader to follow their trail?...I think not]

...the entire discussion about the nation's air defenses HAD to be placed downstream in time from the AA11 beginning, and had to create as many excuses or explanations of incompetence or late notifications as possile so as to distract the media and provide probable deniability to a dumbfounded [and dumbed-down] public.

3. The HI PERPS best defense is that by the time that "hijacking" considerations made their way into the Pentagon and FAA HQs, it was too late to respond and that some form of Pentagon approval would have needed to be made from there...[which is deliberately a slow protocol as it involves the Department of State]. Unfortunately, the truth is that normal scramble protocols DELIBERATELY GO AROUND these high level decision makers BECAUSE they take too much time to make critical decisions that are required to be made IMMEDIATELY so as to either; intercept inbound bombers...OR...to provide assistance for aircraft suffering "in-flight-emergencies".

The HI PERPS are cooked either way because:

a. IF the information about a possible hijacking had made it to the Military in time AND a decision was made that the situation was critical to aircraft safety, then its the responsibility of top commanders to make an immediate scramble order to get around the hijacking red-tape delays. BTW...this is what eventually happened which released the interceptors from Otis at 08:46...BUT...because the scramble order was NOT in an emergency status allowing for first priority handling status, it took six minutes for them to get off the ground thusly, the interceptors actually got airbourne at 08:52. The lack of "emergency status" is yet another clever method of implementing a stand-down without getting caught...except by the likes of air traffic controllers...IF they would ever speak out.

b. IF the aviation events with AA11 had been allowed to be seen as that an airliner might be suffering an "in-flight-emergency", then an IMMEDIATE scramble order would have been concocted between NEADS nd Boston ARTCC...as was the usual scramble protocols parcticed for the ten years before. Had this happened, the Otis interceptors would have been airbourne around 08:20-30 or so.

So, no matter what, the Pentagon is cooked...and we need to forever talk about the EARLY aspects of the military's EARLY failures and NOT what happened when they try to establish that it was too late for them to do anything. What a bunch of absolute CRAP about it being too late for the Defense Department to do anything about the airliners that had gone astray...PURE BS !!!!!!!!!!!!! This makes me furious...

So, THIS is why the HI PERPS simply HAVE to keep us all talking about "hijacking-hijacking-hijacking" and "too late-too late-too late" when actually they had enough time in EVERY circumstance.

The HI PERPS simply have had to create vigorous "covers" for the failure of what, in 50 years BEFORE the June Change, would have been a normal and well practiced scramble procedure excercised between the FAA air traffic facilities and NEADS 150 times per year.

However, in unscrambling this matrix of a very complex covert false flag attack AND the required sophisticated "covering of trails" which were each established by Cheney in his secretive "Energy? Meetings", this blog entry is very valuable because it establishes, much like that of the JFK assassination, that important players in the Military establishment were NOT in proper place doing their proper jobs...Rummie included.

All of this study and information is definitely required for us to piece together, or recreate, Cheney's original secretive plans for satisfying the PNAC objectives and creating a false flag attack on the USofA...plans that I now call: The 9/11 Attacks War Game Scenario". With highly secure "compartmentalization" such a war game scenario would be very easy to pull off because operators would have absolutely no idea that the steps that they were performing in operating their roles in the war games were actually parts of the 9/11 Attacks War Game Scenario. Everything is coded...everything is virtual...everything could be hidden in other operations...without any direct knowledge...except by a few such as Cheney in the PEOC. This all fits...and we have the Pentagon by the gonads...unless we give away the early aspects of the aviation activities on 9/11.

Please do not throw the baby out with the bathwater...the Pentagon needs to be held accountable for their conduct from shortyly after 08:14 on 9/11. There are thousands of unanswered questions between that time and the later times that the HI PERPS are trying so diligently to get us and the world to focus upon...IE: AFTER UA93 went missing.

9/11 Truth for World Peace and Justice

Robin Hordon
Kingston, WA

PS: I have just read that there was a specific radar site that was not operational in Massachusetts on 9/11/2001. This is the first that I have heard of this information so if anyone has such a source I would like to have it.-Thanks...rdh

couple questions for Robin

Thanks so much for excellent comment here Robin, very informative but I have a couple questions regarding.

1. Is there a source which tells us there were 67 scrambles prior to June 1? Is there a report or listing that is issued publicly? I've heard this number for a long time now but do not know where it was compiled or reported at. DRG used the same number but his source was an article in the Toronto Star. Is there a public source that can be checked?

2. The June 1 change order should have some type of supporting document like a change document or change order document. For example, an ISO9000 company wants to change a procedure in the official published SOP, a supporting change document must be submitted since the keeper of the official published documents is not the same person that orders the change. They must submit a change document which should have the reasons for the change listed on it. (ie per Management meeting, board meeting, process improvement committee.. etc..)

3. The order was approved by all the joint chiefs of staff wasn't it? Aren't there any meeting summary's or minutes that the JCoS publish and disseminate after their meetings. I presume the Joint Chiefs meet regularly. The reasons for the change in procedure must've been discussed somewhere. Unless we get the meeting summaries from say the last 6 mos and there is no mention of it operation change, that should tell us something there too.

4. Lastly, wasn't the order changed shortly after 9/11?

Thanks for you rhelp if you get to read this. Its a couple days old already and I don't think we always go back and follow up our comments, I know I don't every time. Thanks again, take good care.

dtg86

My first response was censored...I'll try again

1.
I use the same source as does David Ray Griffin regarding the number of scrambles in 2001 prior to June, 2001. All of this could be planted but I have no idea how to get supportive or conflicting information. So, I have built my position on this data.

2.
Yes, this change, like all others should have a clear and identifiable "paper trail" between the originator...which I suspect is The Pentagon-US Military...and all the various participants and end users that would be affected by this change. However, I suspect that the FAA records have been confiscated by the FBI, and of course, anything that was authored by the US Military is certainly buried by the Pentagon. This is a point at which an insider whistleblower would be great...and it could be simply accomplished.

3.
See #2.

4.
Yes, the entire scramble ops were changed in the late morning of 9/11/2001. It all took on a "national defense emergency" approach where interceptors became uber-active. After that the entire scrambling process was redefined and reconstructed WITH these types of hijacks-attacks in mind. However, I have never had an opportunity to read these changes and am only going upon the testimony by the US Military about their new approach.

9/11 Truth for World Peace and Justice

Robin Hordon
Kingston, WA

Couple of errors ...

Robin: There are a couple of apparent errors you make in your comments:

1. You say that " in the months before June 2001 there were 67 scrambles reported," but "NO SCRAMBLES were reported between June, 2001 and the morning of 9/11/2001." However I've seen no evidence whatsoever to support this claim. The Associated Press reported that there had been "67 scrambles from September 2000 to June 2001." This does not mean that scrambles suddenly stopped in June 2001. The statistic simply does not cover the period of June 2001-September 2001.

2. You refer to the significance of the "June change to the Joint Chiefs of Staff involvement regarding interceptor scramble procedures." I assume you are referring to CJCSI 3610.01A, "AIRCRAFT PIRACY (HIJACKING) AND DESTRUCTION OF DERELICT AIRBORNE OBJECTS," which stated, "The NMCC will, with the exception of immediate responses ... forward requests for DOD assistance to the Secretary of Defense for approval." However, the predecessor to that instruction, CJCSI 3610.01, from July 31, 1997, stated almost exactly the same thing: "The NMCC will monitor the situation and forward all requests or proposals for DOD military assistance for aircraft piracy (hijacking) to the Secretary of Defense for approval."

One thing though: There was indeed a specific radar site that was not operational in Massachusetts on 9/11/2001. It is covered in this entry in the Complete 9/11 Timeline:

(6:30 a.m.-12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001: Radar Located in Northeast US Offline for Repair Work
http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a630radaroffline&scale=0

I'll give it my best...

1. As noted in an earlier answer, I use the same sources as does David Ray Griffin regarding the 67 scrambles. This could be planted information, along with the fact that there were NO scrambles reported after the June Change...and it all fits too coincidentally for me anyway...but this is what we have to go on.

However, I have a very, very strong reason for the Pentagon NOT releasing ANY INFORMATION about any scrambles that MAY HAVE HAPPENED between June and 9/11...and it is that if they did release any of these records...anything at all...that would provide for two things:

a. This would create another "track of investigation" from which the Pentagon might be put on the defensives...because...

b. If what I claim is correct, then any records or investigations would show that the NEW scramble protocols indeed DID create a much slower response time than what would have happened BEFORE the June Change.

This is a very powerful argument that I am very, very comfortable at making. Again, such information would all have been classified for "reasons of national security"...aka...avoidance of prosecution.

2. YES, this is what I am referring to, AND, I fully AGREE that the change in wording is minimal.

However, what is NOT minimal is the new LOCATION or POSITIONING of the reference to Special Military Operations which were NOW put under the wing of, or in reference to, or in association with...the Joint Chiefs of Staff's duties and responsibilities.

For me the key is that for over 50 years the relationship between the FAA and the US Military in operating first, high speed only scrambles, and then in the 1970s, perfomed BOTH high speed scrambles and the slower speed "hijacking" scramble protocols, was working perfectly well...the BEST in the world in fact! So, why make the change at all?

Its THIS relocation of the reference to Special Military Operations that exposes the HI PERPS to their "Institutional Stand-Down" of NORAD.

In the FAA-Pentaon-US Military worlds, any changes are informed-educated-exposed to the participants by briefings and its in these briefings that the EMPHASIS upon, but not exact wording of, the new understanding that ALL scrambles would now have to be approved by the Pentagon BEFORE the interceptors were released...thus making all scrambles resemble the slower "hijacking scramble protocol".

Its within these briefings that the FAA ATCs could have easily been misdirected...or kept uninformed which is my guess...and I feel this way because Zalewski got so mad about NOT getting the support that he typically would get under the former protocols when AA11 went into an "in-flight-emergency" status.

This all may be confusing to most folks, but I'm standing firm that I have found the mechanism that the HI PERPS used to effectively "stand-down" NORAD/NEADS on 9/11/2001.

9/11 Truth for World Peace and Justice

Robin Hordon
Kingston, WA

Regarding the "loss" of J53 radar site at North Truro...

This is new information to me and it only indicts the US Military even moreso than before for the following reasons:

1. Its quite expository of the US Military that the NEADS personnel discovered that J53 was down AFTER AA11 was reported to them in that there were pre-arranged War Games that were scheduled that day and if any radar systems were not available for any NORAD sectors during those War games, without any doubt NEADS radar techs would have been told well ahead of time...unless this loss was part of the War Game itself.

2. The timing of the report and/or actual "loss" of this radar system is certainly very coincidental, if not suspicious...indeed.

3. If J53 was a part of the War Games, then such planning would call for an immediate back-up radar system to be put into use to compensate for the loss of J53...and this didn't happen.

4. However, what DID happen, and what the TRUTH is, is testified to by the NEADS radar tech who stated that they should be able to see AA11 ANYWAY...by using another radar site.

5. And if you look closely, the BETTER radar site for "seeing" AA11 would be the radar antennae located [I believe] in or around the JFK airport. AA11 was CLOSER to the JFK site than the North Truro site...and consequently "should have been able to "see" AA11 from north of Albany, NY all the way to NYC. North Truro is about 180-190 NM from where AA11 made its southerly turn...and the JFK site was about 130-140NM from the same spot. Therefore, standard ops at NEADS would be that the JFK radar site would be the PREFERRED radar site from which this radar data would be extracted.

6. Persuant to this point in #5., the information about the North Truro site may be a red herring, AND...this information leads directly into another BIG aspect of NORAD's radar data ops on 9/11...and that is:

7. There was an unexplained 24 second "delay" in the delivery of radar data from NORAD's radar sites that ONLY affected NEADS on 9/11/2001. What this might mean is that BEFORE the radar data was delivered to NEADS from radar antennae...[in this case from the JFK site]...there was opportunity for the target of AA11 to be scrubbed from the data stream...because:

8. NORAD's radar processing and tracking programs not only can create INPUTS in order to run their War games, the NORAD radar programming allows for personnel to make OUT-TAKES of radar and tracking data that is also used to support War games. Since the entire swath of radar data transferred to NEADS and other NORAD sectors is completely digitized and is somehow transmitted through various linkages, this 24 second delay...[which represents TWO complete sweeps, or updates, or "refreshes" of radar data collected by the long range radar systems]...could provide a radar tech opportunity to "eliminate" any digitized target at any location covered by NORAD's radar antennaes. And why could a "radar tech" do such a thing without understanding that it is part of a nefarious scheme?...here is why:

9. There are thousands of individual actions conducted by techs running War Games...and they are all coded and compartmentalized...and this radar tech could have had instructions to "eliminate" certain targets...and those targets could be seen by the radar tech as being over Manitoba...BECAUSE...everything is virtual and easily hidden within normal ops of a War Game. In War Games, there is very, very little information shared by the "opposing elements" of the War Games, so secrecy and isolation is no problem at all.

I'm PSYCHED that this information is out there...because it makes my case about a deliberate "stand-down" by the HI PERPS working clandestinely behind the radar scenes on 9/11 even MORE probable.

9/11 Truth for World Peace and Justice

Robin Hordon
Kingston, WA

Need to investigate Eberhart

Thanks for the thoughtful comments, Cincy911Truth and Vesa. Clearly a new investigation of the 9/11 attacks will need to look a lot more closely at what Ralph Eberhart did or did not do on 9/11. I was astonished at how little information is currently available, considering that he was perhaps the most important military official involved in the emergency response to the attacks. He has hardly ever spoken about what he did on September 11.

Regarding Montague Winfield on 9/11, according to a 9/11 Commission memorandum, while Charles Leidig took over from him in the NMCC, Winfield was "attending a meeting elsewhere in JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] spaces. The meeting was a USAF-convened session for general officers who rated Air Force officers." But that tells us very little, so this would also need to be investigated further.