To believe the Government had advanced knowledge of 9/11 and allowed it to happen or even helped facilatate it is rather hard to believe for some, and debunkers of "9/11 truth" would rather believe official Government documents, and reports, along with mainstream media coverage for their information on wether or not there is any truth of advanced knowledge.

Trying to convince someone that the WTC was blown to pieces with explosives is impossible for some to grasp and understandibly so. In order to even start to believe that you have to believe that it was known that there would be an attack, and have detailed knowledge of it.

So for those that don't believe it could be an "inside job", I will use these official government reports and mainstream media reports to show it is not irrational to come to this conclusion, but rather logical.

"Nobody in our government, at least, and I don't think the prior government, could envision flying airplanes into buildings on such a massive scale."-Pres G Bush
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-04-18-norad_x.htm

However the so called mastermind of 9/11 Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, was already wanted since 1996 because of his involvement in his nephew Ramzi Yousef's terrorist acts such as attempting to blow up the WTC in 1993 and the Bojinka plot, along with an idea that was just being formulated in which hijacked planes would be flown into buildings. Intelligence officials knew of the 9/11 plot since it was just an idea, 6 years before it happened.

Arrested in Manila in 1995 was a co-conspirator of theirs named Abdul Murad. As you can see from this document released thru the FOIA to intelwire the authorities do not want you to know what he told them more than six years before 9/11.

http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/1995-05-11-FBI-FD302-Abdul-Hakim-Murad.pdf

But the people who arrested him revealed what is being kept from us by the government.

According to this Washington Post article......

"CIA officers today admit looks alarmingly like an early blueprint for the September 11 attack on America."

"Philippine investigators called in their American counterparts for help. This was standard operating procedure. According to U.S. and Philippine officials interviewed for this article, both the CIA Manila station chief and the resident FBI legal attache were notified. A team of intelligence agents flew in from Washington."

"But, Philippine and U.S intelligence officials said, the Bojinka operation called for a second, perhaps even more ambitious phase, as interrogators discovered when they pressed Murad about his pilot's license. All those years in flight school, he confessed, had been in preparation for a suicide mission. He was to buy, rent, or steal -- that part of the plan had not yet been worked out -- a small plane, preferably a Cessna, fill it with explosives and crash it into CIA headquarters."

"There were secondary targets the terrorist cell wanted hit: Congress, the White House, the Pentagon and possibly some skyscrapers. The only problem, Murad complained, was that they needed more trained pilots to carry out the plot."

"The FBI knew all about Yousef's plans,". "They'd seen the files, been inside 603. The CIA had access to everything, too."-Philippine policewoman Aida Fariscal

"This should have never, ever been allowed to happen," she repeats angrily. "All those poor people dead."

"Gen. Avelino "Sonny" Razon, one of the lead investigators in the Bojinka case, was so shocked at what he saw on September 11 that he jumped on a plane in Cebu, where he was now police chief, and flew to Manila to convene a hasty press conference. "We told the Americans about the plans to turn planes into flying bombs as far back as 1995," he complained to reporters. "Why didn't they pay attention?"
http://www.prisonplanet.com/bust_and_boom.html

They also siezed the computer of Ramzi Yousef. While the U.S. government treats it's citizens intellect as that of an imbecile, saying that we are attacked and hated becuase we are free, in order to stiffle honest debate about U.S. foreign policy, and the actions of Israel the truth is more logical.....

"One of Yousef's translated documents -- stamped SECRET by Philippine intelligence -- spells out the terrorist cell's broad objectives. "All people who support the U.S. government are our targets in our future plans and that is because all those people are responsible for their government's actions and they support the U.S. foreign policy and are satisfied with it," it declared.

"We will hit all U.S. nuclear targets," the manifesto continued. "If the U.S. government keeps supporting Israel, then we will continue to carry out operations inside and outside the United States to include -- " Here the text terminates ominously."
http://www.prisonplanet.com/bust_and_boom.html

"Intelligence officials had gleaned an almost unparalleled treasure-trove of information on the inner workings of bin Laden's international terrorist network. Cell members did not appear to even know one another's real names. Duties were divided and compartmentalized, and none of the conspirators stayed in the same place for any length of time."
http://www.prisonplanet.com/bust_and_boom.html

In December of 2002 the Report of The Joint Inquiry Into The Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 –by The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was released.

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/fullreport_errata.pdf

This is the closest thing to a real official investigation into 9/11 we have so I will quote it often. In this report is this admission...

"George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), testified that “a common thread runs between the first attack on the World Trade Center in February 1993 and the 11 September attacks.”

In fact lets look at what this report says it found......

FACTUAL FINDINGS
1. Finding: Community did have information that was clearly relevant to the September 11 attacks, particularly when considered for its collective significance.

2. Finding: During the spring and summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community experienced a significant increase in information indicating that Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida intended to strike against U.S. interests in the very near future.

3. Finding: it was the general view of the Intelligence Community, in the spring and summer of 2001, that the threatened Bin Ladin attacks would most likely occur against U.S. interests overseas, despite indications of plans and intentions to attack in the domestic United States.

4. Finding: From at least 1994, and continuing into the summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community received information indicating that terrorists were contemplating, among other means of attack, the use of aircraft as weapons.

5. Finding: Intelligence Community failed to fully capitalize on available, and potentially important, information.

5.a. During 1999, the National Security Agency obtained a number of communications – -- connecting individuals to terrorism who were identified, after September 11, 2001, as participants in the attacks that occurred on that day.

5.b. The Intelligence Community acquired additional, and highly significant, information regarding Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi in early 2000. Critical parts of the information concerning al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi lay dormant within the Intelligence Community for as long as eighteen months, at the very time when plans for the September 11 attacks were proceeding.

5.d. This Joint Inquiry confirmed that these same two future hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, had numerous contacts with a long time FBI counterterrorism informant in California and that a third future hijacker, Hani Hanjour, apparently had more limited contact with the informant.

Those are just some of the interesting findings, so lets go into this report some more, this also from the Senate Intelligence report......

"KSM came to the attention of the Intelligence Community as a terrorist in early 1995 when he was linked to Ramzi Yousef’s “Bojinka Plot” in the Philippines. One portion of that plot involved the idea of crashing an airplane into CIA Headquarters. Through additional intelligence and investigative efforts in 1995, KSM was also connected to the first World Trade Center bombing. He was indicted by a U.S. grand jury in January 1996. The indictment was kept under seal until 1998 while the FBI and CIA attempted to locate him and arrange to take him into custody."

The following is a pathetic attempt of DCI to cover his ass, by basically writing a memo to himself that he could point to later to show how committed he was to fighting terrorism.....from the report:

"The DCI raised the status of the Bin Ladin threat still further when he announced in writing in December 1998 regarding Bin Ladin: “We are at war…I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside the CIA or the [Intelligence] Community.” This declaration appeared in a memorandum from the DCI to CIA senior managers, the Deputy DCI for Community Management and the Assistant DCI for Military Support."

"The Intelligence Community as a whole, however, had only a limited awareness of this declaration."

"In fact, the Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division testified to the Joint Inquiry that he “was not specifically aware of that declaration of war.”

"Furthermore, and even more disturbing, Joint Inquiry interviews of FBI field office personnel indicated that they were not aware of the DCI’s declaration, and some had only a passing familiarity with the very existence of Usama Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida prior to September 11. Neither were the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff aware of the DCI’s declaration."

"The record of this Joint Inquiry indicates that the DCI did not marshal resources effectively even within CIA against the threat posed by al-Qa’ida. Despite the DCI’s declaration to CIA officials that the Agency was at war with Bin Ladin, there is substantial evidence that the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center needed additional personnel prior to September 11, and that the lack of resources had a substantial impact on its ability to detect and monitor al-Qa’ida’s activities."
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/fullreport_errata.pdf

I would like to remind the reader that the President thought so highly of the DCI he was given the The Presidential Medal of Freedom Award. The Presidential Medal of Freedom, is the nation's highest civilian award.
http://www.medaloffreedom.com/

While world citizens were shocked at the attacks on 9/11, and the government claims they were caught totally off guard the fact is several of the alleged 9/11 hijackers were under surveillance including the ringleaders not just the two living with an informant in California, and had been for quite some time.........

"The CIA and NSA had sufficient information available concerning future hijackers al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi to connect them to Usama Bin Ladin, the East Africa embassy bombings, and the USS Cole attack by late 2000, and there were at least three different occasions when these individuals should have been placed on the State Department’s TIPOFF watchlist and the INS and Customs watchlists. Nonetheless, this was not done, nor was the FBI notified of their potential presence in the United States until late August 2001."

"The Chief of the FBI’s Financial Review Group – which had been only a section in the FBI’s White Collar Crime Unit before September 11-- and the Director of the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) both testified before the Joint Inquiry that, prior to September 11, they had capabilities to develop leads on terrorist suspects and link them to other terrorists and to terrorist funding sources."

"They both agreed that they would have been able to locate Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar in the United States in August 2001, if asked, through credit card and bank information. The use of these capabilities in the first weeks after September 11 enabled the FBI, with assistance from the Secret Service, to connect almost all of the 19 hijackers to each other very quickly by linking bank accounts, credit cards, debit cards, address checks, and telephones. Despite the existence of those capabilities, the FBI did not seek their assistance in the search for al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in late August 2001."

"By early January 2000, CIA knew al-Mihdhar’s full name and that it was likely Nawaf’s last name was al-Hazmi, knew that they had attended what was believed to be a gathering of al-Qa’ida associates in Malaysia, was aware that they had been traveling together, and had documents indicating that al-Mihdhar held a U.S. B-1B- 2 multiple entry visa that would allow him to travel to and from the United States until April 6, 2000. CIA arranged surveillance of the meeting and the DCI was kept informed as the operation progressed."

"Despite having all this information, and despite the republication of CTC guidance regarding watchlisting procedures in December 1999 (see Appendix, “CTC Watchlisting Guidance – December 1999”), CIA did not add the names of these two individuals to the State Department, INS, and U.S. Customs Service watchlists that are used to deny individuals entry into the United States."

"DCI Tenet acknowledged in his testimony before the Joint Inquiry that CIA’s watchlisting training had been deficient and that a mistake had been made in the failure to watchlist both al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi promptly."

"The CIA did not advise the FBI about al-Mihdhar’s U.S. visa and the very real possibility that he would travel to the United States."

These two individuals would come to America and live with an FBI informant. Are we supposed to believe this is simply a coincidence? Or is there the possibility that this FBI informant is also a CIA informant? Is this possible?

Back to the report....

"On October 12, 2000, two Al Qa’ida terrorists attacked USS Cole as the destroyer refueled in Yemen. In investigating the attack, the FBI developed information that Khallad bin Attash had been a principal planner of the bombing and that two other participants in the Cole conspiracy had delivered money to Khallad in Malaysia at the time of the Malaysia meeting. The FBI shared this information with the CIA, whose analysts decided to conduct a review of what was known about the meeting."

"In January 2001, CIA concluded, based on statements by a joint CIA/FBI human source, that Khallad appeared in one of the surveillance photos taken during the Malaysia meeting."
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/fullreport_errata.pdf

As you can see there are "joint CIA/FBI human sources". The fact that two 9/11 hijackers were living with an intelligence informant is shocking and must be explained, he also had contact with a third 9/11 hijacker, Hani Hanjour.......from the Senate Intelligence report.....

"FBI personnel believe it likely that the informant met Hanjour in December 2000 and are unable to explain why the informant failed to identify Hanjour."

A closer look at this informant as reported by the Senate Intelligence report....

"The informant’s credibility is called into question in other important ways:

• The informant made a variety of inconsistent statements to the FBI during the course of multiple interviews. The informant has provided the FBI with many different dates as to the informant’s numerous contacts with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar and their initial contact. The FBI acknowledged that “San Diego agrees with [the] Joint Inquiry…that there are significant inconsistencies” in the informant’s reports.

• Some of the informant’s statements are not consistent with information developed through investigation concerning the dates of the contacts. The FBI concedes that the hijackers may have known the informant months earlier than the informant admitted.

• [redacted]

• [redacted]

• The informant told the FBI after September 11, 2001 that al-Hazmi had told the informant that he was moving to Arizona for flight training and never mentioned flight training he received while living in San Diego.

• [redacted]

• [redacted]

"Several questions remain, however, with regard to the informant’s credibility.
First, while there are several indications suggesting that future hijacker Hani Hanjour had contact with the informant in December 2000, the informant has repeatedly advised the FBI that the informant does not recognize photos of Hanjour. Second, the informant told the FBI that the hijackers did nothing to arouse the informant’s suspicion, but the informant also acknowledged that al-Hazmi had contacts with at least four individuals the informant knew were of interest to the FBI and about whom the informant had previously reported to the FBI. Third, the informant has made numerous inconsistent statements to the FBI during the course of interviews after September 11, 2001. Fourth, the informant’s responses during an FBI polygraph examination to very specific questions about the informant’s advance knowledge of the September 11 plot were judged by the FBI to be “inconclusive.”

"In its written response, the FBI acknowledges “unexplained inconsistencies” in the informant’s reporting which continue to warrant ongoing FBI investigation."
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/fullreport_errata.pdf

The Senate Intelligence Committee wanted to talk with this informant and was refused. Everyone should know this. Our elected officials who represent us, shortly after the attacks of 9/11 wanted to interview the landlord of some 9/11 hijackers who was an intelligence informant.,.....and they were prevented from doing so. By the President of the United States.

From the report.....

"The Administration has to date objected to the Inquiry’s efforts to interview the informant in order to attempt to resolve those inconsistencies. The Administration also would not agree to allow the FBI to serve a Committee subpoena and deposition notice on the informant. Instead, written interrogatories from the Joint Inquiry were, at the suggestion of the FBI, provided to the informant. Through an attorney, the informant has declined to respond to those interrogatories and has indicated that, if subpoenaed, the informant would request a grant of immunity prior to testifying."
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/fullreport_errata.pdf

This is important. This investigation was halted by the President. This treasonous act needs to be addressed. Instead of calling for a new investigation how about allowing this original one to continue? What reason is there for supporting the idea that our elected officials representing us have no right to talk to an informant housing people who murdered 3000 Americans? But it gets worse. You, the reader. If you are an American tax payer, you paid this informant $100,000 in order to not cooperate with this investigation. I would like a debunker to explain to me why they are OK with this.

Six months after this Senate Intelligence report was made, according to this footnote in the DOJ IG report, this informant was paid from our tax money $100,000. I want to know what agency paid him this money.

"In July 2003, the asset was given a $100,000 payment and closed as an asset." {footnote number 197}
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/fbi-911/chap5.pdf

According to the co chairman of the Senate Intelligence committee Sen Bob Graham......"It was the only time in my senatorial experience that the FBI has refused to deliver a legally issued congressional subpoena. What that tells me is the FBI wasn't acting on its own but had been directed by the White House not to cooperate."
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2004/09/08/graham/print.html

One reason for protecting and sheilding this informant would be if he was not just an FBI informant, but another joint FBI/CIA informant. Until this informant is allowed to be interviewed by my elected officials I have every right and reason to believe that. Turns out not only were these three 9/11 alleged hijackers under the nose and most probably under survelance of Intelligence officials well before 9/11 but several others were as well, the ringleaders infact. Which would most likely lead to the rest.

From the Senate Intelligence report.....

"CIA and FBI counterterrorism operations and investigations prior to September 11, 2001 repeatedly produced intelligence relating to two individuals in Hamburg, Germany – Mamoun Darkazanli, a suspected logistician in Bin Ladin’s network, and Mohammed Zammar, a suspected recruiter for al- Qa’ida. The CIA had been seeking more information about Darkazanli" [redacted........redacted]

"The FBI legal attaché in Germany did not recall getting information about Darkazanli and Zammar from the German government or the CIA before September 11. He was unaware that Darkazanli and Zammar had been the subject of government investigations before the attacks."
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/fullreport_errata.pdf

What is being redacted, and what is the story with Darkazanli? For further information there is this from the Chicago Tribune.....

"HAMBURG, Germany _ Nearly two years before the Sept. 11 hijackings, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency began persistent efforts to recruit as an informer a Syrian-born Hamburg businessman with links to al-Qaida and the key hijackers, the Chicago Tribune has learned.

The CIA's attempts to enlist Mamoun Darkazanli were initiated in late 1999, at a time when three of the four Hamburg students who would later pilot the hijacked planes were first learning of the hijacking plot at an al-Qaida training camp in Afghanistan.

Darkazanli, 44, has acknowledged knowing the three pilots, Mohamed Atta, Marwan Al-Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah, with whom he attended the same radical Hamburg mosque, Al Quds, and shared several common friends in this city's sizable but insular Muslim community.

...the CIA was seeking to turn Darkazanli into a spy during the time the initial hijacking plans were being laid represents the earliest and deepest set of U.S. intelligence footprints outside the hijackers' window.

In December 1999 the CIA representative in Hamburg, posing as an American diplomat attached to the U.S. Consulate, appeared at the headquarters of the Hamburg state domestic intelligence agency, the LFV, that is responsible for tracking terrorists and domestic extremists.

According to a source with firsthand knowledge of the events, the CIA representative told his local counterparts that his agency believed Darkazanli had knowledge of an unspecified terrorist plot and could be "turned" against his al-Qaida comrades.

"He said, `Darkazanli knows a lot,' " the source recalled.

Darkazanli's name had first surfaced the year before in the U.S. investigation of al-Qaida's 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 people and injured thousands.

One of those later convicted of conspiracy in that case was Osama bin Laden's former personal secretary, a naturalized U.S. citizen named Wadih El-Hage, whom prosecutors accused of personally delivering bin Laden's order for the embassy bombings to al-Qaida operatives in Kenya.

As part of his duties for bin Laden, El-Hage helped fashion a skein of fictitious Sudanese companies that al-Qaida allegedly used as fronts for its terrorist activities. One such company was Anhar Trading, of which El-Hage was managing director, and whose business cards bore the address of the Hamburg flat Darkazanli shares with his German-born wife.

Around the same time, Darkazanli's name had popped up in connection with another alleged al-Qaida figure, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, a 44-year-old Sudanese who is currently in jail in New York awaiting trial in the embassy bombing case.

Salim, who is also accused by federal prosecutors of attempting to help bin Laden obtain enriched uranium for use in a nuclear weapon, was arrested in Munich in September 1998 at the request of the United States.

Investigators learned that Salim, a resident of the United Arab Emirates, held an account at a Hamburg bank. The co-signatory on the account was Mamoun Darkazanli, whose home number had been programmed into Salim's cell phone.

The Americans began pressing the Germans to arrest Darkazanli, a naturalized German citizen who moved to Hamburg from Syria in 1982, and extradite him to the United States. The Germans countered that they had no evidence to warrant an arrest.

"Nobody could prove terrorism," one German investigator said. "In general, the American colleagues feel more persons should be arrested. Hundreds! But the problem is you have to prove this is intentional planning of criminal activities."

At the insistence of the United States, the Germans opened an investigation of Darkazanli that included occasional surveillance. One of those involved described how Darkazanli, certain he was being followed, walked down the street while looking backward over his shoulder.

But the investigation did not include more costly and time-consuming electronic surveillance, and a German investigator conceded that, before Sept. 11, his agency considered al-Qaida a lower priority target than Hamburg's radical Turks and neo-Nazis.

By the end of 1999 the Darkazanli investigation had produced little of value. Now the Americans were saying that if the Germans couldn't put Darkazanli behind bars, they wanted to turn him into their informer.

The LFV representatives explained to the CIA man, who had been in his post for less than six months, that German law forbids foreign intelligence services, including those deemed to be "friendly," from conducting operations or recruiting informers inside German borders.

Any attempt to recruit Darkazanli on behalf of the CIA would have to be made by operatives of the LFV. In early 2000, around the time the hijack pilots were returning to Hamburg from Afghanistan, an LFV agent casually approached Darkazanli to ask if he was interested in becoming a spy.

Darkazanli replied that he was just a businessman who knew nothing about al-Qaida or terrorism. When the Germans informed the CIA representative that the approach had failed, the man refused to accept their verdict that Darkazanli was not recruitable.

"He was not happy," one source said. "He kept saying, `It must be possible.' "

When the LFV asked for information it could use to counter Darkazanli's claims that he knew nothing about terrorism or al-Qaida, the CIA demurred. What the LFV got instead was a CIA textbook lecture on the recruiting of agents.

As it happened, at the end of January 2000 Darkazanli had met in Madrid with Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, the accused al-Qaida leader in Spain, who is from Darkazanli's hometown of Aleppo, Syria.

The meeting, monitored by Spanish police who were watching Yarkas, included a number of suspected al-Qaida figures. But if the CIA was aware of the Madrid meeting, it hadn't told the LFV, whose second attempt to recruit Darkazanli fared no better than the first.

By the late summer of 2000, Atta, Al-Shehhi and Jarrah had departed Hamburg for Florida, where they were learning to fly single-engine airplanes.

Left behind in Hamburg, allegedly to handle logistical and administrative chores for the hijacking operation, were Atta's roommates, Said Bahaji, Ramzi Binalshibh and Zakariya Essabar. All have since been charged with conspiracy in the events of Sept. 11.

Darkazanli knew Bahaji, whose wedding he had attended at the Al Quds mosque. A videotape made at the wedding, confiscated by police in a post-Sept. 11 search of Bahaji's apartment, includes a harangue by Binalshibh on the holy war against the "enemies of Islam."

Intensifying its efforts to turn Darkazanli into an informer, a frustrated CIA abandoned the Hamburg LFV and took its case directly to federal German intelligence officials in Berlin.

"Another attempt by the Americans to get somebody to recruit Darkazanli," one source said.

Whether yet another approach was made to Darkazanli by the federal domestic intelligence service, the BFV, could not be determined. Darkazanli did not respond to a registered letter from the Chicago Tribune requesting an interview.

Immediately after Sept. 11, however, American intelligence operatives and FBI agents descended on Hamburg in force. According to a senior German intelligence official, the FBI undertook its own surveillance of Darkazanli.

That surveillance would have been illegal under German law. But with the horror of more than 3,000 deaths at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and a Pennsylvania field dominating the world news, the Germans looked the other way.

"I don't judge it," the senior official said.

Darkazanli's name first surfaced publicly two weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks, when the "Mamoun Darkazanli Import-Export Company" appeared on the Bush administration's initial list of individuals and organizations suspected of involvement in terrorism.

The company is evidently defunct. No incorporation records for the company are on file at the Hamburg courthouse, and sources said it had not done enough business over the years to support Darkazanli and his wife.

When the German federal prosecutor, Kay Nehm, announced an investigation into possible money laundering by Darkazanli and his company on behalf of al-Qaida, the news that Darkazanli was in trouble spread quickly through al-Qaida's network.

In Madrid, Spanish police listening in on Imad Yarkas's cell phone overheard a conversation in which Abu Nabil, the leader of a Syrian extremist organization known as the Fighting Vanguard, warned Yarkas that Darkazanli had caught the "flu" that was going around.

To the reporters who flocked to his apartment in well-kept Hamburg neighborhood, Darkazanli admitted having known Mohamed Atta, Marwan Al-Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah as fellow worshipers at the downtown Al Quds mosque. But Darkazanli declared that he knew nothing about terrorism or the Sept. 11 plot.

The bank account he shared with Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, Darkazanli told the Los Angeles Times, had been opened in March of 1995 to facilitate Salim's attempted purchase of a commercial radio transmitter. Darkazanli said he hadn't seen Salim since the transmitter deal fell through a few months later.

Two days after the Sept. 11 attacks, Darkazanli had been brought in for questioning by the German federal police, and his apartment thoroughly searched. The police, Darkazanli said, had found nothing. His inclusion on the Bush administration's list of designated terrorist entities was just "a big misunderstanding."

A few days after Darkazanli's police interview, detectives questioned Mohamed Haydar Zammar, another Syrian-born Hamburg resident who has since acknowledged encouraging Atta, Al-Shehhi and Jarrah to make their fateful visit to al-Qaida in Afghanistan.

Asked whether he knew Darkazanli, Zammar replied: "Yes, I know him well. He is a friend who I have known for a long time."

Police later learned that it was one of Zammar's brothers, Abdulfattah, who had driven Darkazanli to the Madrid meeting with Spanish al-Qaida leader Yarkas in January 2000.

The absence of documents in Darkazanli's flat was partly explained on Oct. 31, 2001, when a young Serbian immigrant with a record of convictions for burglary walked into the fortresslike headquarters of the Hamburg police.

The man presented astonished detectives with a bag full of documents that appeared to have been taken from Darkazanli's files. After accepting the purloined documents, the police arrested the man for burglary.

According to the burglar's story, he had discovered the documents stashed in a small summer house outside Hamburg that he had broken into. He had first gone with the documents to the U.S. Consulate in Hamburg, where it had been suggested that he take them to the police.

But when police asked the burglar to show them the house where he had found the documents, he couldn't locate it.

"We all thought, `CIA,' " one German investigator said.

The CIA representative in Hamburg, who was recalled to Washington in July, declined to comment last week. Since the arrival of his successor, relations with the CIA are described by German intelligence agents as "more collegial."

Darkazanli's lawyer, Andreas Beurskens, said he had advised his client not to speak with the media until the police investigation is complete.

But as the Sept. 11 investigations on both sides of the Atlantic have progressed, more links have emerged between Darkazanli and al-Qaida.

One is the disclosure that Darkazanli received at least $16,000 from Mohamed Kaleb Kalaje Zouaydi, a wealthy Spanish-Syrian arrested in Madrid in April and accused of funneling hundreds of thousands of dollars to al-Qaida and other radical Islamic organizations.

Another is the discovery by German investigators that Darkazanli was previously employed by Abdul-Matin Tatari, an Aleppo-born textile exporter in Hamburg whose own links to the Sept. 11 hijackers are under investigation by German police.

Police sources say they have expanded the Darkazanli investigation to include his business transactions over the years.

In view of what the expanded investigation was producing, one source said, "the situation for Darkazanli might become more complicated."
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-8937523_ITM

Is there any proof that the CIA was successful in their attempts to recruit Darkazanli? Yes, there is. While those around him are picked up and tortured in secret prisons, he stays out of jail. That's pretty much a dead give away.

"While still in high school, Zammar began to be associated with Jihadists through Mamoun Darkazanli, a fellow Syrian and al-Qaeda financier."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_Haydar_Zammar

"On October 27, 2001, Zammar traveled to Morocco. Not long afterwards, he was arrested by Moroccan police with the assistance of the U.S. Although he was a German citizen and under investigation by Germany, German intelligence only learned about the arrest from the newspapers in June 2002.

Instead of being deported to the U.S. or Germany, Zammar was secretly sent to Syria for indefinite detention in the notorious Far'Falastin detention center in Damascus. Time Magazine reported: "U.S. officials in Damascus submit written questions to the Syrians, who relay Zammar's answers back. . . State Department officials like the arrangement because it insulates the U.S. government from any torture the Syrians may be applying to Zammar."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_Haydar_Zammar

"Mamoun Darkazanli, 46, who was fighting extradition to Spain, was released from custody in Hamburg, where he had been in detention since last October."
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4692375.stm

"Germany has rejected a fresh request from Spain to extradite a German-Syrian businessman accused of being Al-Qaeda's financier in Europe, authorities said Monday.

A spokesman for the justice department of the northern city-state of Hamburg said it had sent its refusal late last week to the Spanish court that had sought Mamoun Darkazanli.

"We now assume that the Darkazanli case is closed for us," the spokesman said, marking the latest failure of Spanish investigators to prosecute the 48-year-old."
http://www.eubusiness.com/Living_in_EU/al-qaeda.7/

He is free today. Kind of obvious isn't it?

And then there is this concerning another alleged 9/11 hijacker Marwan Alshehhi......

"Hamburg - The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had one of the September 11, 2001 terror pilots under surveillance as early as March 1999 after a tip from German security services, according to joint investigative reports in Germany.

The reports said the CIA had detailed information about Marwan Alshehhi, and the fact that he was from the United Arab Emirates and studying in Germany.

The CIA had his cellphone number and knew that he was in contact with Haydar, whom the Americans had suspected of being al-Qaeda's contact man in Germany."
http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,,2-10-1462_1401481,00.html

And this from the NY Times, where the head of the 9/11 Commission Philip Zelikow acknowledges this information.....

"In March 1999, German intelligence officials gave the Central Intelligence Agency the first name and telephone number of Marwan al-Shehhi, and asked the Americans to track him.

The name and phone number in the United Arab Emirates had been obtained by the Germans by monitoring the telephone of Mohamed Heidar Zammar, an Islamic militant in Hamburg who was closely linked to the important Qaeda plotters who ultimately mastermined the Sept. 11 attacks, German officials said.

After the Germans passed the information on to the C.I.A., they did not hear from the Americans about the matter until after Sept. 11, a senior German intelligence official said.

The Germans considered the information on Mr. Shehhi particularly valuable, and the commission is keenly interested in why it apparently did not lead to greater scrutiny of him.

The information concerning Mr. Shehhi, the man who took over the controls of United Airlines Flight 175, which flew into the south tower of the World Trade Center, came months earlier than well-documented tips about other hijackers, including two who were discovered to have attended a meeting of militants in Malaysia in January 2000.

The independent commission investigating the attacks has received information on the 1999 Shehhi tip, and is actively investigating the issue, said Philip Zelikow, executive director of the commission.

Close surveillance of Mr. Shehhi in 1999 might have led investigators to other plot leaders, including Mohammed Atta, who was Mr. Shehhi's roommate.

"The Hamburg cell is very important" to the investigation of the Sept. 11 attacks, Mr. Zelikow said. The intelligence on Mr. Shehhi "is an issue that's obviously of importance to us, and we're investigating it," he added.

Asked whether American intelligence officials gave sufficient attention to the information about Mr. Shehhi, Mr. Zelikow said, "We haven't reached any conclusions."

The joint Congressional inquiry that investigated the Sept. 11 attacks was told about the matter by the C.I.A., but only a small part of the information was declassified and made public in the panel's final report in December 2002, several officials said. The public report mentioned only that the C.I.A. had received Mr. Shehhi's first name, but made no mention that the agency had also obtained his telephone number.

Officials involved with the work of the joint Congressional investigation made it clear that the publication of a more complete version of the story was the subject of a declassification dispute with the C.I.A. A former official involved with the Congressional inquiry acknowledged that having a telephone number for one of the hijackers was far more significant than simply having a first name."
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/24/politics/24TERR.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5070&en=91a2d2d4b3d7b02a&ex=1228971600&adxnnlx=1228...

This is what we know. Imagine what we don't know. And more importantly what is deliberatly being kept from us.