here's the full mineta arguement (need to add in the CNN thing from yesterday)

http://www.members.shaw.ca/truth914/mineta.html

with respect to the fact that maybe united 93 was 50, 30 and 10 miles out... here's what i have. as i said, this is probably the weakest section of my paper, but it is not even really needed any more because we have proven Mineta's timeline correct. but anyways, here is what i have for my United 93 section. if anyone has anything that i should add, let me know.

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Maybe United 93 was “50 miles out”?

Supporters of the official story of 9/11 claim that Mineta must have witnessed a conversation between Cheney and a young man about Flight Untied 93. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, it would seem possible that the young man and Cheney could have been talking about United 93. The 9/11 Commission Report claims that the flight crash landed at 10:03 in Shanksville , Pennsylvania because the passengers tried to overtake the cockpit from the hijackers. This could account for Mineta’s testimony, assuming he was confused on the time of his arrival in the PEOC. This claim does not however account for the inconsistencies about Cheney’s timeline of when he entered the PEOC. It cannot account for the stories by ABC news and the changing account of the Military’s response to AA 77 which included Phantom AA 11. This claim also cannot even begin explain the numerous contradictions in Richard Clarke’s account. The Government’s changing official story of what happened to United 93 is absurd and contradicted by many credible sources, most notably Richard Clarke. Since day one, there have been suspicions that United 93 was shot down by the U.S. Military because of the fear that it would have been used as a weapon to attack targets on the ground. The 9/11 Commission Report attempted to eliminate any suspicion of this allegation by claiming that military notification of United 93 came after the plane already crashed and authorization to shoot down hijacked aircrafts came after United 93 was down.

The first problem with claiming that Mineta overheard a discussion about United 93 is that it crashed approximately 125 miles [62] away from Washington D.C. Therefore, United 93 was never “50 miles out” of the White House, Pentagon, or any other specific target. It certainly was not “30 miles out” or “10 miles out” either.

However, the 9/11 Commission paints a picture of incompetence and confusion that still makes it seem possible that Mineta witnessed the young man and Cheney discussing United 93 or a medevac helicopter or some combination thereof. The argument is quite farfetched and doesn’t make sense with respect to Mineta’s testimony, especially considering it has Cheney giving an order to shoot down a plane that was already down and an order to shoot down a medevac helicopter.

9/11 Commission Report: [63]

At 10:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft-presumably hijacked-heading toward Washington . That aircraft was United 93.The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA. The FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington , not its actual radar return. Thus, the Secret Service was relying on projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania.217

At some time between 10:10 and 10:15, a military aide told the Vice President and others that the aircraft was 80 miles out. Vice President Cheney was asked for authority to engage the aircraft.218 His reaction was described by Scooter Libby as quick and decisive, "in about the time it takes a batter to decide to swing." The Vice President authorized fighter aircraft to engage the inbound plane. He told us he based this authorization on his earlier conversation with the President. The military aide returned a few minutes later, probably between 10:12 and 10:18, and said the aircraft was 60 miles out. He again asked for authorization to engage. The Vice President again said yes.219

At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment," suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President.220

The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a two-minute conversation that obtained the confirmation. On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary.221

Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down in Pennsylvania . Those in the shelter wondered if the aircraft had been shot down pursuant to this authorization.222

At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. At 10:33, Hadley told the air threat conference call: "I need to get word to Dick Myers that our reports are there's an inbound aircraft flying low 5 miles out. The Vice President's guidance was we need to take them out."223

Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. In the apt description of one witness, "It drops below the radar screen and it's just continually hovering in your imagination; you don't know where it is or what happens to it." Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter.224

Although the 9/11 Commission Report does not address Mineta’s testimony, some defenders of the official theory claim that Mineta witnessed a discussion about Flight 93, not the plane approaching the Pentagon. When looking at the totality of Mineta’s testimony in response to Lee Hamilton’s questions, it does not seem plausible that the plane which was 50, 30 and 10 miles out could have been Flight 93.

9/11 Commission Hearing Testimony: [64]

MR. MINETA: And then later I heard of the fact that the airplanes had been scrambled from Langley to come up to DC, but those planes were still about 10 minutes away. And so then, at the time we heard about the airplane that went into Pennsylvania , then I thought, "Oh, my God, did we shoot it down?" And then we had to, with the vice president, go through the Pentagon to check that out.

MR. HAMILTON: Let me see if I understand. The plane that was headed toward the Pentagon and was some miles away, there was an order to shoot that plane down.

MR. MINETA: Well, I don't know that specifically, but I do know that the airplanes were scrambled from Langley or from Norfolk , the Norfolk area. But I did not know about the orders specifically other than listening to that other conversation.

MR. HAMILTON: But there very clearly was an order to shoot commercial aircraft down.

MR. MINETA: Subsequently I found that out.

MR. HAMILTON: With respect to Flight 93, what type of information were you and the vice president receiving about that flight?

MR. MINETA: The only information we had at that point was when it crashed.

MR. HAMILTON: I see. You didn't know beforehand about that airplane.

MR. MINETA: I did not.

MR. HAMILTON: And so there was no specific order there to shoot that plane down.

MR. MINETA: No, sir.

Based on the conversation that he overheard between the young man and Cheney, Mineta clearly explained that there were no orders to shoot down United 93 and that “the orders” referred to AA 77. Mineta explained that the first time they heard of United 93, it had already crashed. Mineta makes no mention or reference to the fact that they were tracking and attempting to shoot down United 93 after it already crashed, or that they almost shot down a medevac helicopter.

Commissioner Lee Hamilton admitted to CBC that it was not clear who gave the order to shoot down the hijacked aircrafts, which is a central claim used to defend against accusations that Untied 93 was shot down.

CBC: [65]

To this day, it is unclear who was really giving the most critical orders on 9/11. The most controversial question regards the order to shoot down commercial airliners if they were hijacked -- an order which could have killed hundreds more innocent people. The 9/11 commissioners have suggested the President and the Vice President have not been forthcoming about that issue and that the truth has yet to be revealed. The record shows that between 10:10 and 10:15 in the White House bunker, the Vice President was asked if military pilots could shoot down any hijacked aircraft headed for Washington . He immediately gave the order. The problem is that only the President had the authority to do so. Later, both Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney claimed to the 9/11 Commission that the President actually gave the shoot-down order about 15 minutes earlier, but the White House call records do not support their claim. Lee Hamilton, vice chair of the 9/11 Commission says it wasn't clear who gave the order, "The principals haven't said. The President and the Vice President are the only ones that can clarify that completely. And we just don't know what happened there."

The other astonishing fact about the shoot-down order is that it was never relayed to the fighter pilots who might have carried it out. "No, we never got the order. What we were told is that you can expect to shoot down the next hijack track. It was kind of informational only. There was no order, no authentication, nothing even remotely close to what would be required to fire on a plane," remembers Duffy. "The idea that the President of the United States can give an order and the Air Force doesn't get it, that's serious stuff," says Kean, chair of the 9/11 Commission.

MSNBC also reported that staffers on the 9/11 Commission did not believe Cheney’s version of events.

MSNBC: [66]

Around 9:35 on the morning of 9/11, Cheney was lifted off his feet by the Secret Service and hustled into the White House bunker. Cheney testified to the 9/11 Commission that he spoke with President Bush before giving an order to shoot down a hijacked civilian airliner that appeared headed toward Washington . (The plane was United Flight 93, which crashed in a Pennsylvania field after a brave revolt by the passengers.) But a source close to the commission, who declined to be identified revealing sensitive information, says that none of the staffers who worked on this aspect of the investigation believed Cheney's version of events.

Although officials at Herndon told FAA headquarters that United 93 was hijacked by 9:34, the 9/11 Commission Report claims that they stubbornly refused to notify the military, despite encouragement to do so from FAA personnel in the field. [67] [NOTE 11] United 93 crashed at 10:03, meaning that officials at FAA headquarters would have known of the hijacking for nearly half an hour yet did not relay this information to the military. The 9/11 Commission Report claims that “by the time the military learned about the flight, it had crashed” [68] and that “NORAD did not even know the plane was hijacked until after it had crashed”. [69]

9/11 Commission Report: [70]

Despite the discussions about military assistance, no one from FAA headquarters requested military assistance regarding United 93. Nor did any manager at FAA headquarters pass any of the information it had about United 93 to the military.

Military Notification and Response. NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center at 10:07. Unaware that the aircraft had already crashed, Cleveland passed to NEADS the aircraft's last known latitude and longitude. NEADS was never able to locate United 93 on radar because it was already in the ground.171

At the same time, the NEADS mission crew commander was dealing with the arrival of the Langley fighters over Washington , D.C. , sorting out what their orders were with respect to potential targets. Shortly after 10:10, and having no knowledge either that United 93 had been heading toward Washington or that it had crashed, he explicitly instructed the Langley fighters: "negative- negative clearance to shoot" aircraft over the nation's capital.172

This account that the military did not know about United 93 until after it crashed is contradicted by earlier reports in the public record. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told the Boston Globe on September 15th, 2001 “that the Air Force was tracking the hijacked plane that crashed in Pennsylvania on Tuesday after other airliners slammed into the Pentagon and World Trade Center and had been in a position to bring it down if necessary.” [71]

USA Today: [72]

The Nashua controllers have learned through discussions with other controllers that an F-16 fighter stayed in hot pursuit of another hijacked commercial airliner until it crashed in Pennsylvania , the employee said.

Although controllers don't have complete details of the Air Force's chase of the Boeing 757, they have learned the F-16 made 360-degree turns to remain close to the commercial jet, the employee said.

"He must've seen the whole thing," the employee said of the F-16 pilot's view of United Flight 93's crash near Pittsburgh . The flight took off from Newark Airport for San Francisco , and authorities say the hijackers were headed for another target in Washington , D.C.

Richard Clarke’s account in his book is perhaps the most glaring contradiction of the 9/11 Commission Report. He wrote in his book that FAA notified everyone in the video teleconference that United 93 was hijacked shortly before the Pentagon was struck. This seems reasonable because FAA headquarters received this information at 9:34 and therefore relayed this information shortly after it received word of the hijacking. Clarke reported still seeing Rumsfeld on the screen of the video conference and then talking to Myers who both would have learned of United 93’s hijacking at around 9:40.

Richard Clarke’s Book: [73]

I resumed the video conference. “FAA, FAA go. Status report. How many aircraft do you still carry as hijacked?”

Garvey read from a list: “all aircraft have been ordered to land at the nearest field. Here’s what we have as potential hijacks: Delta 1989 over West Virginia , United 93 over Pennsylvania …”

Stafford slipped me a not. “Radar shows aircraft headed this way.” Secret Service had a system that allowed them to see what FAA’s radar was seeing. “I’m going to empty out the complex.” He was ordering the evacuation of the White House.

Ralph Seigler stuck his head into the room, “There has been an explosion in the Pentagon parking lot, maybe a car bomb!”

Defenders of the official story and the 9/11 Commission Report claim that since Mineta witnessed a discussion about United 93, his timeline was therefore off by around half an hour. The logic that is used to support this claim is that Mineta arrived at the White House sometime after 9:45. Mineta mentioned in one sentence in his testimony that when he “got to the White House, it was being evacuated.” It is clear that Stafford ’s order to evacuate the White House went into effect sometime between 9:40 and 9:45. Clarke recounted that at this time that the “Uniformed Secret Service guards yelled at the women, “If you’re in high heels, take off your shoes and run-run!””. [74] Defenders of the official story therefore claim that it was at this time that Mineta arrived at the White House since this is when the main evacuation was taking place. However, there is still overwhelming evidence to suggest that Mineta arrived at around 9:20, before the Pentagon was struck. Mineta did make this one seemingly contradictory statement but subsequently explained that he had arrived before the Pentagon was struck many times and in great detail. Supporters of the official story therefore focus on this passing statement as evidence for an incorrect timeline despite the fact that Mineta’s testimony went into significant detail that left no question about his time of arrival. Furthermore, there is a perfectly rational explanation why Mineta would say that the White House was being evacuated when he arrived at 9:20. As Clarke wrote in his book, long before Mineta’s arrival at 9:20, Clarke “would evacuate the White House” and Secret Service wanted Condoleeza Rice and Dick Cheney to go to the PEOC. [75] Therefore, when Mineta arrived at 9:20, it is reasonable for him to think that the White House was being evacuated since people had evacuated to the PEOC and Clarke’s order to evacuate White House had been in effect for some time now. It is clear that the urgent evacuation did not begin until sometime around 9:40 or 9:45 but it is certainly possible that Mineta would be under the impression that the White House was being evacuated by 9:20. In any case, this passing statement made by Mineta is definitely a weak argument since it implies that Mineta had been accurate about this single general statement, yet the rest of his testimony, which he had given in detail, was incorrect.

In addition to the accounts which acknowledged military notification of United 93 long before the supposed heroic actions were taken by the passengers, all anyone has to do is look at the pictures of the crash site to see that a Boeing 757 did not crash land there. [NOTE 12] There is overwhelming evidence to prove that United 93 did not crash land and was therefore likely shot down by the military. [76]

Instead of admitting that Flight 93 was shot down, the 9/11 Commission Report describes a series of bazaar cell phone and airphones calls that were made by the passengers who described their plan to overtake the cockpit from the hijackers. The CBC ( Canada ’s Public Television Station), with host Evan Solomon, investigated the claims about the cell phone calls in their September 10th, 2006 exposé into the so called “9/11 Conspiracies”.

CBC: [77]

EVEN SOLOMAN: Critics have another claim about Flight 93. The cell phone calls made by passengers to loved ones, were not technically possible. Why not? Cell phones, they allege, do not work over 30,000 feet.

DAVID RAY GRIFFIN : Flight 93 was evidently above 30,000 feet. So it would have been completely impossible. This is very strong evidence that all these cell phone calls were fabricated. And if the cell phone calls were, then probably the airphone calls were too.

EVEN SOLOMAN: In fact, we recently tried to use our cell phones on a flight over Washington and could not get a signal at all. So what do defenders of the official story say?

JIM MEIGS (POPULAR MECHANIS): We talked to leading engineers across the cell phone industry, and they told us that cell phone work, not perfectly, but reasonably well in airplanes up to 35,000 feet and more.

He was reporting an exchange he overheard between Cheney and an officer. That is the only significant fact. What he may have thought they were talking about, especially after the fact, is not important except to the extent he offers reasons why based on contemporaneous observations.

"50 miles out" of where? How can you assume that point is the Pentagon? What if they say it was a line beyond which a plane would not be allowed to approach, and that line was in Pennsylvania?

Did we ever get the name of the aid?

GAME OVER, for the "official story"!!!

Now you see why the shills try to perpetuate the the lie that AA-77 struck the Pentagon, just like Cheney said it did!!!

Good night people.

colombo, you're a moron... stop writing everything in bold and acting like you know so much better than everyone else... we all know that AA 77 didn't hit the pentagon. but that has very little to do with mineta's testimony.

I mean, that the Mineta testimony is refering to flight AA77.

This would imply that the official version of the Pentagon attack is correct.
I have a real hard time believing that flight 77 flew all the way back from Ohio hitting the Pentagon.