DFrum@aei.org

http://www.davidfrum.com/

This guy was responsible for the term "axis of evil", an evil genius, isn't he?

Yesterday he gave an interview with German newsmagazine Spiegel Online.
(german: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,461225,00.html )
(english: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,461225,00.html )

He admits the biggest mistake back in 2001 was to left Pakistan and Saudi Arabia off the hook for their terror-involvement.

But then he goes on with only bla bla bla about the reason why.

So I decided to sent him an encouraging e-mail to help him onto his feet...

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Dear David!

I have read your interview in the german news magazine Spiegel Online with reporter Georg Mascolo.

You ask, why Saudi-Arabia and Pakistan were not on the table back in 2001.

What utter nonsense to pretend you do not know the truth.
But we do...and we'll hold you accountable...

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,461225,00.html

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The US commited an inside job with 911, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia both played roles in setting up the patsies. Under the control of western intelligence...
Eat this:

The Pakistan Connection:

http://z15.invisionfree.com/Loose_Change_Forum/index.php?showtopic=4606&hl=

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The Saudi-Connection:

"Bin Laden was, though, a product of a monumental miscalculation by western security agencies. Throughout the 80s he was armed by the CIA and funded by the Saudis to wage jihad against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. Al-Qaida, literally "the database", was originally the c[B]omputer file of the thousands of mujahideen who were recruited and trained with help from the CIA to defeat the Russians."

http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,12780,1523838,00.html

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The court papers filed by Cantor Fitzgerald charge that the Saudi monarchy directly and indirectly funded and controlled charity and relief organizations that in turn financed Al Qaeda. The lawsuit further alleges that the Saudi government knowingly employed Al Qaeda operatives, provided them with safe houses and false documents, and assisted them in obtaining weapons and military equipment.

“This uninterrupted financial and material support and substantial assistance enabled the Al Qaeda defendants to plan, orchestrate and carry out the Sept. 11 attacks,” the lawsuit states.

The Port Authority’s announcement on the lawsuit came close on the heels of renewed charges by Florida Senator Bob Graham that the Bush administration orchestrated a cover-up of Saudi involvement in the September 11 attacks.

In a newly released book, Intelligence Matters, Graham asserts that “evidence of official Saudi support” for at least some of the hijackers is “incontrovertible.” Graham is the ranking Democrat and former chair of the Senate intelligence committee that carried out a joint congressional investigation into 9/11 with its counterpart in the House of Representatives.

...

After landing in Los Angeles in January 2000, al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were met by Omar al-Bayoumi, an employee of the Saudi civil aviation authority. US investigators have concluded that al-Bayoumi was a Saudi intelligence agent. Al-Bayoumi invited the pair to move to San Diego, where he found them an apartment, provided them with money and helped enroll them in flight school.

It has been reported that al-Bayoumi served as conduit for thousands of dollars in funding for the future hijackers sent by Princess Haifa, the wife of Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the US and a close confidante of the Bush family. Al-Bayoumi’s monthly paycheck as a contractor for Saudi civil aviation—for which he did no discernable work—rose from $465 to $3,700 after he began assisting the two Al Qaeda operatives.

Why the extreme measures taken to deflect any investigation into the Saudi connection to the terrorist attacks?

Many—most prominently Craig Unger in his book House of Saud, House of Bush and Michael Moore in his film Fahrenheit 9/11—have highlighted the intricate web of political and financial ties that bind the Bush family to Saudi interests. These are undoubtedly real—there is ample evidence that Saudi money underwrote George W. Bush’s failed business ventures—and played a significant role in the administration’s political calculations.

Others have pointed to the strategic role played by Saudi oil in the US economy. Again, this is clearly a major consideration within US ruling circles, where there is little stomach for a policy that could further destabilize the crisis-ridden Saudi monarchy.

But there is another, and more immediately compelling reason for suppressing any investigation into the Saudi connection. It inevitably raises two questions: Why would Saudi intelligence assist the 9/11 hijackers; and, given its longstanding and intimate ties to the CIA, how could it be that its actions were unknown in Washington?

The nature of the ties between the Saudi and US intelligence establishments merit closer scrutiny. They were solidified in the US-backed war against the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, beginning in 1979 and continuing through the 1980s. The US poured billions of dollars in arms and financing into this war, most of it funneled through the ISI, the Pakistani intelligence agency.

The Saudi regime established what amounted to a matching fund for the anti-Soviet guerrillas, many of whom were brought to Afghanistan by Islamist forces in the Middle East. Osama bin Laden served as the Saudi regime’s personal emissary in this cause, helping to organize, train and equip Arab volunteers for the Afghan war.

The movement now known as Al Qaeda was spawned through the interaction of these three intelligence agencies—the CIA, the ISI and the Saudis.

The Saudi connection to Al Qaeda clearly remained intact.

http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/sep2004/911-s16.shtml

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Michael Springmann, head US consular official in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, later claims that during this period he is “repeatedly told to issue visas to unqualified applicants.” He turns them down, but is repeatedly overruled by superiors. Springmann loudly complains to numerous government offices, but no action is taken. He is fired and his files on these applicants are destroyed. He later learns that recruits from many countries fighting for bin Laden against Russia in Afghanistan were funneled through the Jeddah office to get visas to come to the US, where the recruits would travel to train for the Afghan war. According to Springmann, the Jeddah consulate was run by the CIA and staffed almost entirely by intelligence agents. This visa system may have continued at least through 9/11, and 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers received their visas through Jeddah, possibly as part of this program. [BBC, 11/6/2001; Associated Press, 7/17/2002; Fox News, 7/18/2002]

Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi, Salem Alhazmi, and Khalid Almihdhar obtain US visas through the US Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. [US Congress, 7/24/2003] All three are already “al-Qaeda veterans” and battle-hardened killers. Almihdhar’s visa is issued on April 7, and he thereafter leaves and returns to the US multiple times until April 6, 2000. [Stern, 8/13/2003] Nawaf Alhazmi gets the same kind of visa; details about Salem are unknown. The CIA claims the hijackers then travel to Afghanistan to participate in “special training” with at least one other suicide bomber on a different mission. The training is led by Khallad bin Attash. The CIA will learn about Almihdhar’s visa in January 2000 (see January 2-5, 2000). The Jeddah Consulate keeps in its records the fact that Nawaf and Alhazmi obtain US visas several days before Almihdhar, but apparently these records are never searched before 9/11. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 pdf file]

May 21, 2002: Fraudulent Consular Staff Admits to Providing Hijackers with Visas

Abdulla Noman, a former employee of the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers got their visas, says that he took money and gifts to provide fraudulent visas to foreigners. He pleads guilty and is convicted. About 50 to 100 visas were improperly issued by Noman from September 1996 until November 2001, when he was arrested. However, a former visa officer in Jeddah, Michael Springmann, has claimed in the past that the Jeddah office was notorious for purposefully giving visas to terrorists to train in the US (see September 1987-March 1989). [Associated Press, 5/21/2002]

US Consulate, Jedda, Saudi Arabia Office participated in the following events as a passiveparticipant:
July 4, 2001: Hijacker Who Should Have Been on Watch List Re-enters US Without Difficulty

Hijacker Khalid Almihdhar reenters the US. The CIA and FBI have recently been showing interest in him, but have still failed to place him on a watch list of US-designated terrorists. Had he been placed on a watch list by this date, he would have been stopped and possibly detained as he tried to enter the US. He enters on a new US visa obtained in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on June 13, 2001. [US Congress, 7/24/2003 pdf file] The FBI notes that he returns just days after the last of the hijacker “muscle” has entered the US, and speculates that he returns because his job in bringing them over is finished. [US Congress, 7/24/2003 pdf file]

October 23, 2002: Handling of Hijackers’ Visa Applications Denounced

Visa applications for the 15 Saudi Arabian hijackers are made public, and six separate experts agree: “All of them should have been denied entry [into the US].” Joel Mowbray, who first breaks the story for the conservative National Review, says he is shocked by what he saw: “I really was expecting al-Qaeda to have trained their operatives well, to beat the system. They didn’t have to beat the system, the system was rigged in their favor from the get-go.” A former US consular officer says the visas show a pattern of criminal negligence. Some examples: “Abdulaziz Alomari claimed to be a student but didn’t name a school; claimed to be married but didn’t name a spouse; under nationality and gender, he didn’t list anything.” “Khalid Almihdhar ... simply listed ‘Hotel’ as his US destination—no name, no city, no state but no problem getting a visa.” Only one actually gave a US destination, and one stated his destination as “no.” Only Hani Hanjour had a slight delay in acquiring his visa. His first application was flagged because he wrote he wanted to visit for three years when the legal limit is two. When he returned two weeks later, he simply changed the form to read “one year” and was accepted. The experts agree that even allowing for chance, incompetence, and human error, the odds were that only a few should have been approved. [New York Post, 10/9/2002; ABC News, 10/23/2002]

http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/entity.jsp?entity=us_consulate,_jedda,_saudi_arabia_office

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Sitting-Bull
Germany