Delayed publication of the Chilcot report

The 10th anniversary of the publication of the Commission report has just passed.

This message was sent to the following UK media: Daily Mail, Express, Telegraph, Guardian, Observer, The Times, The Sunday Times, Independent, Evening Standard, Channel 4 News and ITN news.

I am writing with reference to the continued delay in the publication of the Chilcot report into the invasion of Iraq.

Given Lady Butler-Sloss was forced to stand down over a perceived conflict of interest, I hope the information contained in this letter will be useful.

The mandated investigation timeframe for the enquiry is “the period from the summer of 2001 to the end of July 2009” and hence encompasses the 9.11 attack. No evidence was found to link Iraq to 9.11 and a UK report entitled “Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States” published in October 2001 forewarns the reader with a caveat stating “This document does not purport to provide prosecutable case against Osama Bin Laden in a court of law”. So the evidence was good enough for two illegal invasions but not for a jury.

Of course the response by the media will only be silence and editorials will be published in September repeating the tired old ad-hominem attack that the 9/11 truth movement consists of “crazy conspiracy theorists” when we all know it is a derogatory and one sided term used by those who have an interest in not investigating the evidence in order to create censorship and shut down debate.

22nd July 2014 is the tenth anniversary of the publication of the 9.11 Commission Report. Presumably, Bush and Cheney had nothing to fear so they blocked an investigation for 14 months. Once forced to do so by 9.11 family relatives (since they are also conspiracy theorists given they wanted the truth), the Commission was initially given only $3million and 18 months (despite the Challenger investigation costing $40million). I would have thought Bush and Cheney would have wanted to get to the truth of what happened and why, so why the stonewalling and feet dragging? Maybe it was the fear it would cost Bush a second term so they had to ensure the three top individuals who led the enquiry were going to protect the Bush administration.

Thomas Kean, who had been feted to be a GOP Presidential candidate, was selected by the White House to be Chairman not because of his foreign policy and intelligence issues expertise (in fact he had none whatsoever) but, according to Philip Shenon (author of [i]The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation[/i]), he was selected due to “the belief that he would be more sensitive than other candidates to the executive branch”.

Co-Chairman Lee Hamilton headed the House investigations into Iran-Contra and the ‘October Surprise’ scandals in the 1980s. During that period he became close friends with Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Cheney and this friendship continued after they returned to the Bush administration in 2001 (according to Shenon, Hamilton “always trusted both men to tell the truth”). Hamilton had a notorious reputation, even among Republicans, for cooperation and not being an aggressive investigator. In fact Rumsfeld and Cheney told White House staff that Hamilton could be trusted.

The Executive Director selected by Kean and Hamilton and who controlled the Commission staff and directed the investigation was Philip Zelikow. He had a long friendship with Condaleeza Rice dating back to the late eighties. In 2001, prior to 9.11, he worked on the Bush transition team and effectively demoted Richard Clarke to a less significant role in counter-terrorism. Rice also asked him to write the national security paper that gave the Bush administration the justification to pre-emptively invade Iraq. Zelikow gave none of this information to Lee Hamilton for his press release which Zelikow then reviewed before handing it out to journalists.

Given this history, it shouldn’t be a surprise Zelikow concentrated on the work of team 3 which dealt with counterintelligence and how the Clinton and Bush administrations responded to the al-qaeda threat. Because he effectively demoted Richard Clarke during the transition period, Clarke refused to allow the Commission advanced reading of his book [i]Against All Enemies[/i] unless he received in writing that Zelikow would not be allowed to read it. Zelikow also tried to turn the investigation into an Iraq invasion sales pitch by making sure two individuals who advocated the policy, Abraham Sofaer and Laurie Mylroie, were interviewed first in public hearings. He additionally tried to get information inserted into the report to say that Iraq was behind 9.11 even though there was absolutely no evidence to suggest this and he was forced to relent under pressure.

Kean and Hamilton claim in their book [i]Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission[/i] that “the starting point for our report was that it would focus on the facts. We were not setting out to advocate one theory or interpretation of 9/11 versus another” yet in setting up the investigation teams “we needed to tell the story of al-qaeda’s most successful operation – the 9/11 attacks – so we created staff team 1A”. The investigation effectively started with a conclusion by accepting the truth of what the US Government claimed happened on 9.11 even though Kean and Hamilton claimed they were independent and impartial.

If the purpose of the investigation was not to set “out to advocate one theory or interpretation of 9/11 versus another” (assuming the word “theory” implies [i]all[/i] theories should be considered impartially and objectively) then there should have been a staff team on the investigation tasked to look at the evidence to determine whether elements or individuals within the Bush administration had the means, motive and opportunity to either deliberately allow the attack to happen or to plan it.

So the 9.11 investigation consists of 1) a Chairman who was deemed to protect the White House, 2) a Co-Chairman who had established friendships with Rumsfeld and Cheney and 3) an Executive Director who had established friendships with Karl Rove, Condaleeza Rice and Rumsfeld’s assistant, Stephen Cambone and other Pentagon officials, I would think an impartial and objective investigation into the truth of 9.11 was going to be unlikely.

Because the inquiry was politically compromised and the fear that it would cost Bush a second term, the purpose of the Commission was not to get to the truth of 9/11 but to protect the White House and so had to obscure the facts and evidence that pointed to Government complicity. An examination of the report by David Ray Griffin set out in his book [i]9/11 Commission: Omissions and Distortions[/i] illustrates the extent to which the evidence pointing to US complicity was either distorted or omitted.

Then there is of course the collapse of World Trade Centre 7 which NIST was forced to admit collapsed in freefall. The City of New York has recently received 67,000 signatures to get an investigation of the collapse of WTC7 on to the statute book in November (http://highrisesafetynyc.org/) which the current mayor is already resisting. A third building that collapses on 9.11 officially due to ordinary building contents fire when it was not hit by a plane and such collapses have never occurred in history is just conspiracy theory that the mainstream media have conveniently ignored for over ten years.

Given it is known that the Bush administration entered office in 2001 with a policy of invading Iraq, Bush later admitted Saddam Hussein had nothing to do with 9.11 and the controversy over the “Downing Street” memo and the decision to invade, it follows the Chilcot enquiry should have investigated into why and how the 9.11 attack was used as a part of the decision making process. There should be no surprise the Chilcot enquiry report has not yet been published. Of course if Government officials have nothing to fear, they have nothing to hide (it works both ways).

9.11 and the invasion of Iraq are entwined and individuals who have researched and understood these events will be justifiably sceptical of what the report will say and how far reaching the report’s recommendations will be.