As you are probably aware, the media is full of stories about the destruction of CIA videotapes and sorting though this story is now our top priority. We have added two categories to deal with all the new information emerging, Destruction of CIA Interrogation Tapes and High Value Detainees, which you can find under the ‘War on Terrorism’ Outside Iraq meta-category on the front page. The new events are:

The story breaks: Last week, the CIA admitted it had videotaped detainee interrogations, apparently to pre-empt a New York Times story, which appears to have been inspired by a new development in the Zacarias Moussaoui case. All hell then broke lose, oversight committees suggested CIA Director Hayden had misled the public in his statement, some questioned whether the CIA manager who was blamed, , was just a scapegoat, and Robert Baer had some relevant comments. A CIA officer also appeared in the media with some revelations about waterboarding.

Who knew what when: Initially, the CIA got control of the prisoners from the FBI, without Attorney General Ashcroft complaining. The CIA started videotaping interrogations of high value detainees in spring 2002. Some congressional leader were detainee interrogation program, but most members of the House and Senate intelligence committees were kept in the dark. The CIA told some congressional leaders about the tapes and was told not to destroy the tapes. The tapes were viewed by CIA lawyers. The judge in the Moussaoui trial requested some tapes, but got nothing. The CIA later became worried officers would be prosecuted, and the Moussaoui judge asked again. The CIA then destroyed the videos around the time the media broke the “black sites” story. The House Intelligence Committee was informed over a year later, the Senate Intelligence Committee after the scandal broke.

What may have been on the tapes: Several high-ranking militants, including Hambali, were waterboarded. The use of “enhanced” interrogation techniques by the US is bound up with the story of Abu Zubaida, arrested in Pakistan in late March 2002. Initially, the FBI is said to have enjoyed success with rapport-building techniques, but the CIA complained and a new team arrived led by two psychologists who used methods they had learned on a simulated KGB program on Zubaida. There were no clear legal guidelines for interrogations at this point. Alarmed by these techniques, Another psychologist and the FBI then left, not wanting to have anything to do with the “enhanced” methods. CIA headquarters closely monitored Abu Zubaida’s interrogation and President Bush took a personal interest in Abu Zubaida’s interrogation, but was shielded from knowledge of harsh techniques. The administration also exaggerated Abu Zubaida’s intelligence value. Later, a secret Justice Department ruling authorized detainee abuse and another another declared all CIA interrogation techniques legal. The CIA banned waterboarding some time in 2006.

Sidebars:
9/11 Commission: The 9/11 Commission was unhappy with the information it was getting from detainees, but an attempt to get direct access failed, and it did not receive the CIA interrogation tapes.
Gitmo: The FBI is currently building cases against Gitmo prisoners in case the military commissions collapse, senior defense officials asked for convictions before the 2008 elections, and a legal advisor interfered with the prosecutions.
Black sites: The CIA’s black sites are still operating and President Bush has re-authorized enhanced interrogation methods.

Elsewhere, Zacarias Moussaoui’s flat was allegedly raided after the embassy bombings, London police could not find Moussaoui’s girlfriend after 9/11, and Moussaoui’s London connection was played down at his trial. In August 2001, a key Justice Department unit was not consulted about the request to search his belongings and the FBI failed to reconsider getting a criminal warrant when the FISA warrant application was blocked.

Arms dealer Victor Bout helped the Taliban ship gold, began to work with the US after 9/11, hinted at government connections, and evaded arrest, apparently with US help.

“Abu Omar” was recruited by the CIA in Albania and moved to Italy, where he was kidnapped by the CIA. Italian authorities then issued arrest warrants for the CIA officers involved in the kidnapping.

Al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash applied for a US visa in 1999, but the CIA missed three opportunities to learn more about him. If they had not been missed, it would have led the US to more information about 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi.

The CIA bizarrely stopped reviewing NSA transcripts of al-Qaeda calls after a short time in 2000, and reduced the FBI’s access to NSA information in 2001.

Miscellaneous entries include ones about the US military knowing Osama bin Laden’s location, but failing to attack him, Pakistan’s ISI protecting Abu Zubaida, bin Laden paying US$ 1 million to the prime minister of Pakistan, and a CIA operation to track militants passing through Dubai airport.